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AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW
JERSEY v. SCHUNDLER: ESTABLISHED
ENDORSEMENT IN NEED OF "SUPREME"
INTERVENTION
GABRIEL ACRI*
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
houses one of the most basic and indispensable concepts of
American democracy-the separation of church and state.' This
principle is embodied in the amendment's Establishment Clause,
which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion... . 2 The Framers of the Constitution
included this explicit guarantee in order to ensure that religion
would be permitted to exist independent of government
regulation or intervention. 3 While the text of the Establishment
Clause is somewhat ambiguous,4 it implicitly demands that
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Loyola
College in Maryland.
1 See Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos
in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 540 (1990) ("The
Court should recognize the first amendment as the guardian of one of the most
profound concepts underlying democracy-the separation of church and state.").
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1947) (discussing the
historical underpinnings of the Establishment Clause and the principles
guiding Thomas Jefferson and James Madison in constructing the First
Amendment); John W. Huleatt, Accommodation or Endorsement? Stark v.
Independent School District- Caught in the Tangle of Establishment Clause
Chaos, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 657, 660 (1998) (discussing Jefferson's and
Madison's theo-political philosophy and early colonial attempts to guarantee
separation of church and state).
4 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, at xxi. (2d ed. 1994) (describing the Founding Fathers as
"vague if not careless draftsmen"). Despite the Clause's ambiguity, the Supreme
Court in Everson articulated what meaning the Clause holds at a minimum,
stating:
The "establishment of-religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
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church and state be separate and distinct, and that there be a
"wall of separation"5 dividing the two.6 Furthermore, the
Establishment Clause also prohibits Congress from supporting or
sponsoring any religion.7  The principles embodied by the
Establishment Clause reflect one of the core values upon which
the republic was founded.8
In preserving the protections of the First Amendment, courts
have scrutinized carefully any restriction imposed on this
fundamental liberty.9 Despite the significance of the
Establishment Clause, the United States Supreme Court has
been unable to provide one coherent standard by which to judge
government involvement in religion. As a result, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has become one of the most controversial
and unsettled bodies of American law.1o
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
5 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (internal quotations omitted)
(discussing the "wall of separation" metaphor introduced by Thomas Jefferson
in his reply to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802). Jefferson's "wall of
separation" metaphor has been criticized as a poor analogy for the ideal
relationship between church and state. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107
(1985).
6 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (noting that "[t]he Court has sometimes
described the Religion Clauses as erecting a 'wall' between church and state").
7 It has been argued that the Establishment Clause is primarily concerned
with halting potential "government sponsorship" of religion. See RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 4 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 453 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that the Establishment
Clause "is a prohibition of government sponsorship of religion which requires
that government neither aid nor formally establish a religion").
8 See LEVY, supra note 4, at xii. (recognizing that "[tihe Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment... does more than buttress freedom of
religion... [it] functions to depoliticize religion; [and] thereby helps to defuse a
potentially explosive situation").
9 See generally Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995) (holding that a state which permits holiday displays on state-owned
ground could not deny a permit to the Ku Klux Klan to display an unattended
cross on the grounds that it was a violation of the Establishment Clause);
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
10 See ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
there is "much confusion and plenty of room for jurisprudential disagreement
[concerning the Establishment Clause]") (Nygaard, J., dissenting); James M.
Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The
ESTABLISHED ENDORSEMENT
The often enigmatic realm of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has led to review of numerous government
initiatives in an attempt to determine the bounds of religious
establishment." Government sponsorship of religious holiday
displays has been one such source of controversy. 12 Whether the
government may permit or erect a "holiday" display involving
religious symbols, either on government-owned land or by using
government funds, has proven to be fertile ground for
constitutional debate. 13 The contemporary standard used to
determine the constitutionality of holiday display questions is the
"endorsement" test. 4 According to this analysis, a holiday
display is constitutional unless it is found that the government,
in permitting or erecting the display, has "engage [d] in a practice
that has the effect of promoting or endorsing religious beliefs."'1
In defining "endorsement," a court looks at a number of factors
Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 671, 671 n.6 (1990) (noting that "the application of the Establishment
Clause to actual instances of alleged governmental support of religion has
revealed sharp philosophical divisions among the Justices"); see also Huleatt,
supra note 3, at 657 (acknowledging Justice Scalia's view that the complexity of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is "embarrassing").
11 See generally Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38 (involving a state statute allowing a
one-minute moment of silence for voluntary prayer and meditation); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (prohibiting salary benefit for non-public school
teachers); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemption
for church property); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting prayer in
public schools); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (permitting state reimbursement of bus
fare to parents of children who attend non-public schools); see also WILLIAM B.
LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
1024 (8th ed. West Pub.) (noting that "[slince 1947, a substantial number of
cases have dealt with the meaning of the establishment clause").
12 See GREGG IvERs, REDEFINING THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER 104 (1993) ("Perhaps no other area of
recent church-state conflict generated as much political divisiveness and
bruised feelings over such a short period of time as did the several visible and
controversial cases involving challenges to state-sponsored displays of religious
symbols in public places.").
15 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627-32; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; Elewski v.
Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a city's display of a crbche in
a public park does not violate the Establishment Clause); ACLU v. Florissant,
17 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (finding that a city's display of a crbche and
other religious symbols violated the Establishment Clause), rev'd, 186 F.3d
1095 (8th Cir. 1999); Amancio v. Somerset, 28 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D. Mass. 1998)
(finding that a holiday display violated the Establishment Clause).
14 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (discussing the meaning of the term
"endorsement").
15 Id. at 621.
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such as the "context, composition, and location"16 of the display to
decide its constitutionality. 17 This test, initially thought of as a
solution to the ailing state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence,18 is itself flawed and has proven to be difficult to
interpret and apply.19 These flaws have proven that the
endorsement test is an inadequate means by which to resolve
holiday display controversies.
Part I of this Note outlines the basic evolution of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence through a discussion of
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding holiday
displays and the analyses applied by the Court in these cases.
Part II provides a general overview of the "endorsement test."
Part III discusses the problems inherent in the endorsement test,
including its misapplication in the recent Third Circuit decision
of American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Schundler,20
which epitomizes the dire state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Part IV of this Note discusses the need for the
consistent application of a constitutional test in order to resolve
controversies concerning holiday displays and offers a revised
mode of analysis regarding the resolution of these controversies.
I. ROOTS OF ENDORSEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LAW
Due to the significance of the rights guaranteed by the
Establishment Clause, the history of cases and controversies
surrounding issues of religious establishment is extensive.21 The
16 Doe v. Clawson, 915 F.2d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1990) (breaking the
endorsement test down into three primary components, "context, composition,
and location").
17 See id.
l8See IVERS, supra note 12, at 105 (describing pre-Lynch cases as "flawed
decisions in this area, none of which outlined the proper constitutional
limitations for the lower courts to follow").
19 See id. at 112, 116 (describing Allegheny as a "resolute failure" and
discussing the flaws of Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis).
20 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999).
21 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. For an insightful discussion of
the Framers' intent and the foundations laid down by the ideals of Jefferson
and Madison with regard to the Establishment Clause, see Huleatt, supra note
3, at 657. The roots of the Establishment Clause can be traced back to the ideals
of America's Founding Fathers. Perhaps two of the most vocal of the Founding
Fathers concerned with government establishment of religion were Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison. Jefferson suggested that a "wall of separation" be
ESTABLISHED ENDORSEMENT
United States Supreme Court's watershed decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman22 ushered in the modern period of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 23
A. The Supreme Court's "Lemon"
In Lemon, the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality
of two state statutes that directly provided monetary incentives
to private school teachers. The state statutes, in providing such
incentives, attempted to balance educational output between
private and public schools, thereby securing the optimal level of
education for all students enrolled in public and private schools
alike.24 In determining that the statutes were unconstitutional,
the Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, adopted a three-prong
test. This test has yet to be fully abandoned by the present
Court.25 While Lemon was not a "holiday display" case, the
Lemon test has been used to resolve a variety of Establishment
Clause questions.26
erected severing church from state. Throughout the history of the
Establishment Clause, it has been applied to a number of varying situations
that would have been inconceivable to the Founding Fathers. See id.
22 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23 Traditionally, scholars have argued that the "modern" period of
Establishment Clause law began with the Court's decision in Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Huleatt, supra note 3, at 665 (describing
Everson as "the first modern Establishment Clause case"). Lemon, however,
consolidated previous case law and serves as the root of endorsement analysis,
the subject of this Note. Therefore, for purposes of this Note, Lemon will serve
as the starting point of "modern" Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
2A The Lemon Court tested the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute
and a Pennsylvania statute. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-10. The Rhode Island
statute "authoriz[ed] state officials to supplement the salaries of teachers of
secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools by paying directly to a teacher
an amount not in excess of 15% of his current annual salary." Id. at 607.
Additional restrictions based on "per-pupil expenditure on secular education"
requirements were also imposed. Id. The Pennsylvania statute similarly
allowed the Superintendent of Public Schools to purchase "secular educational
services" from nonpublic schools, and in turn the state would reimburse the
nonpublic schools for their "actual expenditures for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials." Id. at 609.
25 See id. at 612-13.
26 See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (applying the Lemon
test to resolve an Establishment Clause controversy concerning a program
which sent public school teachers into parochial schools to teach disadvantaged
children); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (applying the Lemon test to
resolve a holiday display controversy); see also Huleatt, supra note 3, at 672
(noting that "the Lemon test has proven functional in numerous cases").
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Perhaps of greater significance, Lemon was groundbreaking,
not merely because of the new test it announced, but because it
accurately consolidated prior partial tests hovering above
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that were previously used to
resolve such issues.27 In Lemon, the Court seemed to
acknowledge the need for coherence in Establishment Clause
law. 28 The decision represents the Court's first real push to
attain a functional test. The Court's three-prong analysis was
simply stated and seemingly functional.29 The first prong,
appropriately dubbed the "purpose" prong,30 asks whether the
purpose of the government's action, or intent underlying
legislation, was in fact secular.31 If the answer is yes, there is a
presumption of constitutionality that may be rebutted by inquiry
into the next two prongs.32 If the purpose of the legislation is
found to have been non-secular, the law fails the first prong of
the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.
The final two prongs consider the issues of entanglement and the
effect of the statute.33 The second prong asks whether the
primary effect of the action advances or inhibits religion.34 The
third prong evaluates whether the action will result in excessive
government entanglement with religion.35
27 The Lemon test was pieced together from bits of prior case law. See, eg.,
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (giving rise to the entanglement
prong of the Lemon test); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (giving
rise to the effect prong of the Lemon test).
28 Prior to Lemon, the state of Establishment Clause law consisted of
random applications of scantily-defined rules. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
29 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. In describing the three-prong test, the
Court stated that "[flirst, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, [and] finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.' "Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
30 See id.
31 See id. at 613.
32 The statutes facing constitutional challenge in Lemon were found to
satisfy the purpose prong of the Lemon test. See id. Specifically, the Court noted
that "[ilnquiry into the legislative purposes of the.., statutes affords no basis
for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion." Id.
3 See id. at 612-13.
34 See id. at 612. This prong was satisfied, according to the Court, through a
simple inquiry into the legislative intent underlying the statute. See id. at 613.
35 See id. The final prong of Lemon, the "entanglement" prong, also contains
a consideration of "political divisiveness," which is less often scrutinized than
"entanglement," yet remains inherent within the analysis. Rezai, supra note 1,
at 518-19.
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The Court in Lemon found that the statutes failed the
entanglement prong.36 Inquiry into the "character and purposes
of the institutions37 benefiting from the statutes revealed
excessive government entanglement with religion.38 Ultimately,
the schools' religious character caused an unconstitutional
government entanglement with religion.39
The Lemon test, while fairly well-received, was terribly
inflexible.40 Lemon provided a unique, yet obstinate approach to
the resolution of Establishment Clause issues.41 The rigid three-
prong analysis supported the ideals of those favoring strict
separation of church and state--strict separationists."42
Regardless of Lemon's significance, the Supreme Court, mostly
through the efforts of Justice O'Connor, has shifted the focus of
its analysis of holiday display cases from the three prongs of
Lemon to a more relaxed accomodationist approach.43
Justice O'Connor introduced her analysis, commonly known
as the endorsement test, in Lynch v. Donnelly," where the
36 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (citing the impermissible degree of
entanglement). This prong was analyzed in Lemon by "examin[ing] the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority." Id.
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 The Court stated that "[tihe substantial religious character of these
church-related schools gives rise to entangling church-state relationships of the
kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid." Id. at 616.
40 See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 230 (Terry Eastland
ed., 1993) (citing Safeguarding Religious Freedom, WASH. POST, June 30, 1971)
(noting that the decision in Lemon indicated "a strengthening of the traditional
wall of separation which shields religion in America from governmental
intrusion").
41 See Rezai, supra note 1, at 517 (noting that "[sitrict application of the
Lemon test, however, would nullify most affirmative actions by government to
accommodate religious practices").
42 There exist three primary schools of thought with regard to issues of
religious establishment. See id. at 503-04. The schools of thought, with
somewhat amorphous labels, are the strict separationists, accommodationists,
and flexible accommodationists. See id. (noting that "commentators discussing
these theories often refer to them by different labels such as
'nonpreferentialists' and 'pluralists' "). Id. at 506.
43 See IVERS, supra note 12, at 116 (recognizing that "[t]he endorsement test
does not subject the alleged state sponsorship of religious influences to the same
tough standard as Lemon, but a less rigorous... establishment clause
jurisprudence was the basis for which Justice O'Connor developed it").
44 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of a holiday display
containing a creche. Despite the Court's contemporary
preference for the endorsement test,48 it has yet to overrule
Lemon and continues to make sporadic reference to its test.46
B. Lynch v. Donnelly-Reluctantly Losing Sight of Lemon
Lynch is commonly viewed as one of the most significant
Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of
holiday displays.47 Lynch's significance is twofold. First, it gave
rise to the now-dominant endorsement test.48  Second, by
introducing the endorsement test, Lynch represented the
beginning of the Court's departure from the Lemon standard
with respect to the resolution of controversies surrounding
holiday displays. 49
In Lynch, the majority found the holiday display,
maintained, owned, and erected by the City of Pawtucket, and
placed in a privately owned park, was constitutional.50 The
Supreme Court, in deciding the constitutionality of the display,
applied the three party test of Lemon.51 Justice O'Connor, in her
45 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989) (noting that in
further narrowing what is unconstitutional action, the Court has focused on
whether there is endorsement of religion in the purpose or effect of the
governmental actions).
46 See ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that
subsequent cases had merged the prongs of the Lemon test).47See IVERS, supra note 12, at 106 (describing Lynch as a "landmark"
decision and the first to "open[] the door to this constitutional puzzle house" of
religious establishment).
48 The endorsement test arose from Justice O'Connor's concurrence and was
not the test relied on by the majority in resolving the case. See Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 687-94. Actually, Chief Justice Burger relied on Lemon in holding that the
"winter wonderland" display was constitutional and permissible within the
bounds of the First Amendment. See id. at 681.
49 The next major holiday display case that reached the Supreme Court,
Allegheny, was decided on endorsement grounds. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
592-602.
50 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (holding that "notwithstanding the religious
significance of the crbche, the city of Pawtucket has not violated the
Establishment Clause").
51 See id. at 681-85. The Court stated that "[we are satisfied that the city
has a secular purpose for including the creche, that the city has not
impermissibly advanced religion, and that including the creche does not create
excessive entanglement between religion and government." Id. at 685.
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concurrence, offered a simpler solution to the puzzle.52 O'Connor
believed that the Court should simply ask whether the
government's action of erecting a display "endorse[d]" religion.53
The Lynch display, "essentially like those... found in
hundreds of towns or cities across the Nation,"54 consisted of a
"Santa Claus, house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-
striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,... a clown, an
elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large
banner that reads 'SEASON'S GREETINGS,' and a crbche." 55
The City of Pawtucket owned all the elements of the display.56
Perhaps unique to this display, as opposed to other government-
funded displays that have met constitutional challenge, was the
fact that the display was not located on public property.57 This
factor becomes significant in evaluating the display in its
totality.58 The Court has expressed that displays located on
public property are inherently suspect and carry a strong
presumption, albeit rebuttable, of unconstitutionality.59
In reversing the district court and ultimately upholding the
constitutionality of the display, the Court acknowledged the
inherent impossibility of erecting a literal "wall of separation"
between church and state, effectively "enforc[ing] a regime of
total separation."6o The Court, elaborating on the basis for its
52 See id. at 687. Justice O'Connor stated that she "wr[ote] separately to
suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
53 Id. at 688, 690, 692. Justice O'Connor noted that "[wihat is crucial is that
a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id. at 692.
5 Id. at 671. The relevance of this quote is perplexing. Chief Justice Burger




57 See id. "The display [was] situated in a park owned by a nonprofit
organization and located in the heart of the shopping district." Id.
58 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626-27 (1989) (reciting the risk of
making citizens feel that religion is a factor in determining status in the
political establishment) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59 See id. at 627.
60 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760-61 (1973); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (stating that "[n]o significant
segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in
total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from
government"). In acknowledging the idea of a "wall of separation" as coined by
Thomas Jefferson, the Court admitted that "[t]he Court has sometimes
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interpretation, acknowledged that it had on numerous occasions
declined to impose an absolutionist view of religious
establishment.61 The Court did, however, resolve the issue with
an application of the rigid three-prong test of Lemon.62
In holding that the display was constitutional, the Court
found specifically that the "winter wonderland" displayed in the
city's downtown shopping district, on private land, had a
"secular" purpose. The display was "sponsored by the city to
celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday."63
The Court concluded that this satisfied the first prong of
Lemon.64 The Court recognized that the "purpose" prong analysis
includes reliance upon the context of the display,65 and
determined that the display here would be secular in the context
of the Christmas season.66 The context therefore essentially
transformed the display from a semi-establishment of religion
into a festive and secular "winter wonderland," free from
constitutional implication.
described the Religion Clauses as erecting a 'wall' between church and state."
Id.
61 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) (discussing the long
history of tolerating some aspects of religion in government). Examples included
by the Lynch Court were of the colonists celebrating a day "to give thanks for
the bounties of Nature as gifts from God," and President Washington eventually
proclaiming Thanksgiving "with all its religious overtones" a national holiday.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675. The Lynch Court elaborated by running down a long list
of examples of government interaction with religion. See id. at 675-678; see also
IVERS, supra note 12, at 107 (quoting the Chief Justice in the Lynch case as
saying "[Tihe Framers never intended for the First Amendment to banish
religious celebrations from public life, but rather insisted that their place in the
civic culture mandated constitutional accommodation").
62 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-85.
63 Id. at 681.
6 The Court did not go into much depth in justifying its finding that the
purpose of the display was secular. See id. This prong is generally regarded as
the least important, as evidenced by lower courts' limited dealing with the
prong. See Rezai, supra note 1, at 518 (claiming that "[t]he first prong, which
requires that the government's action have a secular purpose, is relatively easy
to satisfy").
65 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (stating that "the focus of our inquiry must be
on the crbche in the context of the Christmas season"). This concept of "context"
is also very important to resolution of holiday display cases in which the
endorsement test is applied. See Doe v. Clawson, 915 F.2d 244, 248-49 (6th Cir.
1990). This fact illustrates the endorsement roots in Lemon.
66 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (noting that the "inclusion of the crbche is
[not] a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express ... advocacy of a ...
religious message").
ESTABLISHED ENDORSEMENT
The second prong of Lemon asks whether the government
action advances religion.67 Here, the Lynch Court acknowledged
that there may be an advancement of religion, but only of an
"indirect," "remote," and/or "incidental" character that does not
violate the essence of the second prong of Lemon.68 This,
according to the Court, was because both our nation's history69
and legal precedent suggest that some advancement of religion
will be tolerated under the Constitution.70 Thus, the Court's
holding that the display was constitutional, in effect, tolerated a
minimal "advancement" of religion.71
The final prong of Lemon, the entanglement prong, was
applied, satisfied, and clarified in Lynch. 72 Similar to the logic
employed by the Court in resolving the advancement prong, the
Lynch Court determined that "[elntanglement is a question of
kind and degree."73 Specifically, the Court found that any
entanglement which may be present was "de minimis" and
insufficient to support a First Amendment violation.74 The "day-
to-day" upkeep on the display was nominal.7 5 Additionally, the
display itself was of limited value.76 In a related analysis, the
Court also found that the display did not result in political
divisiveness. 7v
Although the Court's holding in Lynch was based on an
evaluation of the display in light of the three prongs of Lemon,
67 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
6 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
69 See id. "[D]isplay of the creche is no more an advancement or
endorsement of religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of
the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of literally
hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums." Id.
70 See id. "[Olur precedents plainly contemplate that on occasion some
advancement of religion will result from governmental action." Id.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 683-85.
73 Id. at 684.
74 See id. "In many respects the display requires far less ongoing, day-to-
day interaction between church and state than religious paintings in public
galleries." Id.75See id. (noting that it did not cost the city anything to maintain the
display).
76 See id. (noting that the creche was only worth approximately two
hundred dollars).
77 Political divisiveness has become an implied consideration in the final
prong of the Lemon test. See id.
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the decisive swing vote came from Justice O'Connor.78 O'Connor
agreed with the majority in that the display was not a violation
of the Establishment Clause, but disagreed with its rationale.
Justice O'Connor evaluated the display by relying on her own
test-the endorsement test.79 O'Connor felt that Establishment
Clause doctrine had become somewhat perverted, and that
Lemon had merely provided guidance in resolving these issues.
O'Connor believed the Lemon test was a bit ambiguous, and
possibly more burdensome than necessary to apply.80 In
response, her concurrence proposed the endorsement test in an
attempt to achieve "a clarification of ... Establishment Clause
doctrine."81
In introducing the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor
framed the issue in terms of non-adherent alienation.2 She
viewed the inherent prohibitions of the Establishment Clause as
safeguards against the government imposition of religion upon a
citizen, which would jeopardize the citizen's status in the political
community by making adherence to a particular religion relevant
to the citizen's political standing.83
To deal with this problem, the endorsement test focuses on
the "message" that the government action sent to non-
adherents8 4 The message violates the Constitution if it allows
78 See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79 See id.
80 See id. at 688-89. "It has never been entirely clear.., how the three
parts of the test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment
Clause." Id.
81 Id. at 687.
82 See id. at 688. Justice O'Connor saw the potential for government to
violate the Establishment Clause in two principle ways-government
endorsement of religion and excessive governmental entanglement. See id. She
considered government endorsement to be the more direct way of violating the
Establishment Clause. See id. It is because of the direct nature of this potential
infringement that Justice O'Connor chose to use it as the focus for her
endorsement standard. See id. at 689-90. The entanglement prong, although
not the basis for her analysis, does provide indirect support for resolution
through her endorsement test. See id. Justice O'Connor retains this idea from
the principles extracted in Lemon. See id. This is evidence of the fact that the
endorsement test is a simplified spawn of Lemon, intended to prevent
disapproval of minority religions from passing constitutional requirements. See
id. at 691-92.
83 See id. at 687. "The Establishment Clause prohibits government from
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community." Id.
84 See id. at 692.
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non-adherents to feel as though they were outsiders, sends the
message that those who exhibit their religious beliefs publicly are
preferred members of the political community.8 5 In essence, such
a message would amount to government endorsement of religion,
serving to undermine the religious beliefs of minority non-
adherents. 86 In an attempt to overcome the often ambiguous
undertones of Lemon, Justice O'Connor framed the issue in a
rather simple and straightforward manner.8 7 O'Connor simply
asked whether the government, by granting permission or
providing assistance in erecting the display, "endorsed" religion.88
In resolving this question, O'Connor viewed the inquiry under
the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon as indispensable
elements of endorsement application.89 Similar to the majority's
finding that total absolutionist prevention of minimal
advancement may be neither possible nor necessary to pass
Establishment Clause limits,90 O'Connor found that advancement
or endorsement may exist on some level, yet still not extend to
the point of violating the Constitution.91 O'Connor, however,
framed the question differently than the majority. The majority
asked the narrow question of whether there was advancement or
endorsement. O'Connor framed the issue more clearly by asking
whether the message of endorsement was negated or
counterbalanced by the context, or "overall holiday setting," and
"what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
display... "92
85 See id. at 688. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community." Id.
86 See id. at 692.87See id. at 688 (noting that Lemon "has never been entirely clear").
8 See id. at 690. "The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has
endorsed Christianity by its display of the creche." Id.
89 See id. "The purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test represent these
two aspects of the meaning of the city's action." Id. Essentially, the first two
prongs of Lemon served as the basis for the conception of the endorsement test.
See id. at 690-91.
90 See id. at 692-93 (noting that the exempt status for religious
organizations, Sunday blue laws, legislative prayers, and the printing of "In
God We Trust" on coins do not violate the Establishment Clause).
91 See id. at 692 (noting that an understanding of the "purpose" of the
display can negate "any message of endorsement of that content").
92 Id.
40 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the display at issue in Lynch
passed the endorsement test because Christmas has long been
accepted as a holiday having a secular meaning. 93 The display
was merely a commemoration of a "public holiday," and
government participation would not generally be understood to
be an endorsement of religion, but rather a commemoration of
the secular holiday.94 O'Connor, therefore, concurred that the
display did not represent what would be tantamount to a
government endorsement of religion.9 5 Since its introduction in
Lynch, the endorsement test has become the preferred mode of
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in resolving holiday
display cases.
C. Allegheny's Embrace of O'Connor's Endorsement
In Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,96 the Court
simultaneously decided the constitutionality of two displays, one
primarily consisting of a menorah and Christmas tree, and the
other consisting of a crbche.97 The Court barely obtained a
majority, and a comically split Court left the state of
Establishment Clause affairs in shambles.98
Allegheny represents the first instance where a majority of
the Court expressly embraced the endorsement test to resolve a
holiday display issue.99 The first display tested in Allegheny
9 See id. at 692-93.
94See id. at 692. "The crbche is a traditional symbol of the holiday that is
very commonly displayed along with purely secular symbols ... ." Id.
95 See id. at 692-93.
96 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
97 See id. at 578.
98 See IVERS, supra note 12, at 112 (noting that "[riather than clarifying the
issues raised in Lynch, the five opinions issued in Allegheny made things
worse").
99 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597. "Thus, despite the divergence at the
bottom line, the five Justices in concurrence and dissent in Lynch agreed upon
the relevant constitutional principles: the government's use of religious
symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious
beliefs .... .". Id. The Court had considered applying the endorsement test in
Establishment Clause cases that did not involve holiday displays many times
between Lynch and Allegheny. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 332 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987). In
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), five justices (Stevens, Marshall,
Blackmun, Brennan, and Powell) appeared to adopt the endorsement test. See
id. at 39, 56. Justice Powell also wrote a concurrence in which he defended the
Lemon test as "the only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted."
Id. at 63. Even though it appeared that the Court was moving toward adopting
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consisted essentially of a creche, highlighted by poinsettias 0
Distinguishing this display from the "winter wonderland" display
in Lynch was the fact that the creche was located on public
property-specifically the "Grand Staircase of the Allegheny
County Courthouse."11 The creche, along with the floral
arrangement, was further accompanied by a sign proclaiming
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo!-Glory to God in the Highest. The
second display, located outside of the city-county building, also
public property, consisted of a Chanukah menorah, a Christmas
tree, and a sign saluting liberty.102
The Court in Allegheny referred to the endorsement test as a
"refined"10 3 mode of analysis that somehow served to clarify or
augment the ideals of Lemon.10 4 The Court extracted two
important concepts from O'Connor's articulation of endorsement
analysis. First, the Court rejected the idea that any toleration of
government endorsement of religion may exist. 05  Second,
similar to Lemon, the Court analyzed the purpose of the display
in determining its constitutionality. 106 Allegheny synthesized
this rule simply by stating that "the government's use of religious
symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing
the endorsement test, they continued to adhere to the three-prong Lemon test.
See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485
(1986); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
100 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580.
101 Id. at 578.
102 See id. at 580.
103 See id. at 592.
104 Here, the majority begins to express its preference for the endorsement
analysis, considering it a further refinement in a perpetual evolution of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for which Lemon was simply an
intermediate stage of developing theory. See id. at 592 ("In recent years, we
have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a concern that
has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence."). The Court
sees endorsement analysis as the latest (and possibly final) stage of
Establishment Clause evolution. See id. In Allegheny, it found the analysis of
the Lynch Court to be full of conclusions lacking explanation and justification.
See id. at 594. The Court went on to refer to Justice O'Connor's Lynch
concurrence as "a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use
of religious symbols." Id. at 595.
105 See id. at 595.
106 See id. ("[Tihe question is 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display.'") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
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religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of
religious symbolism depends upon its context."107
The Court held, contrary to Lynch, that the creche display
was unconstitutional.108 The message conveyed by the creche
was found to be purely religious, and held to have special
significance and centralized meaning to the Christian faith.109 In
analyzing the display, the Court broke it down into its particular
elements.llo Specifically, the Court found the words of the sign,
the creche, and the particular arrangement of the flowers to
represent a clear endorsement of Christianity."'
The unconstitutionality of this display, however, was
primarily a result of its "setting."112 The context of the display
itself did not detract sufficiently from the inherent religious
significance of the creche." 3  The Lynch display contained
multiple focal points, each of which created distinct stories, while
maintaining visual equality.114 Unlike the Lynch display, the
creche in Allegheny was the only focal point of the display."l 5 The
display's only secular objects-the flowers-served to highlight
the religious significance of the cr6che." 6 The absence of secular
objects that would have detracted from the cr~che's inherently
religious message led the Court to find it the focal point of a
purely non-secular display." 7 Furthermore, the crche's location,
on the Grand Staircase of the county courthouse, allowed for
further inference of government approval and endorsement." 8
107 Id. at 597.
108 See id. at 600-01.
109 See id. at 598 ("[Tlhe creche itself is capable of communicating a
religious message.").
110 See id. at 598-600 (providing a vivid description and interpretation of
the display).
111 See id. at 598 (finding the religious meaning of the set up "unmistakably
clear").
112 See id. ("[Tihe effect of a creche display turns on its setting.").
113 See id.
114 See id. (stating that the Lynch display had a significant amount of
various figures and objects).
115 See id. ("Here, in contrast, the creche stands alone: it is the single
element of the display on the Grand Staircase.").
116 See id. at 599 ("The floral frame... serves only to draw one's attention
to the message inside the frame.... [It] contributes to, rather than detracts
from, the endorsement of religion conveyed by the creche.").
117 See id. at 598 (noting that nothing in the context of the display detracts
from the crbche's religious message).
118 See id. at 599-600 ("[Tlhe creche sits on the Grand Staircase, the 'main'
and 'most beautiful part' of the building that is the seat of county
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For these reasons, the display was held to violate the
Establishment Clause.119
The notion that proximity to secular objects can detract from
religious significance enabled the Allegheny Court to find the
second display constitutional.120 The Court reasoned that the
menorah, unlike the creche, was not an entirely religious
symbol.'12 Despite its origin in Judaism, the menorah may be
considered a secular symbol of liberty.122 Under the Court's
theory, this secular perception of the menorah was enhanced
when it was positioned among other secular symbols.123 The
Allegheny Court opined that a Christmas tree, though once
considered a religious symbol, is currently considered a secular
object. 124 The Court further found that the secular tree was the
dominant element or "focal point" of the second display,125 in
contrast to the dominant sectarian symbol of the lone creche in
the first display.126 Therefore, the message conveyed by the
second display was secular and not a violation of the First
Amendment.127
II. ENDORSEMENT OVERVIEW
Currently, the Supreme Court applies the endorsement test
to resolve issues pertaining to the constitutionality of holiday
displays.128 Despite the existence of the endorsement test,
government... No viewer could reasonably think that it occupies this location
without the support and approval of the government.").
119 See id. at 601-602.
120 See id. at 616-21 (finding that the combined display of the tree, the sign,
and the menorah have a secular significance).
121 See id. at 619 (explaining that the menorah serves as "a recognition of
cultural diversity").
122 See id. (describing the sign as a salute to liberty).
123 See id. at 618 (concluding that the "inference of endorsement is not
present").
124See id. at 616 ("Although Christmas trees once carried religious
connotations, today they typify the secular celebration of Christmas."); see also
infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
125 See id. at 617 ("The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant element
in the city's display.").
126 See id.
127 See id. ("The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the
preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season serves to emphasize
the secular component of the message communicated by other elements of an
accompanying holiday display, including the Chanukah menorah.").
128 Although the endorsement test seems to be the preferred analysis of the
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numerous alternative approaches and analyses directed at
interpreting Establishment Clause limits have been
introduced.129 More accurately, the Supreme Court has been
severely divided and inconsistent in its application of the
endorsement test to all Establishment Clause cases. 30 Perhaps
more unsettling is the fact that the Court has had trouble
defining and identifying key elements of the test itself.13'
The endorsement test is an accomodationist derivative of the
first two prongs of Lemon.132  The test evaluates whether
government activity endorses religion in its specific context. 3
Unfortunately, this simplistic formulation is not so easily applied
to often complex and varying fact-sensitive legal situations. 3 4 In
applying the endorsement test, a court determines whether an
"objective observer, who is familiar with the action in question,
would discern [the government action] as state sponsorship of a
particular faith or religion in general." 13 Often this rather
straightforward application has been misconstrued, twisted, and
Supreme Court in resolving holiday display issues, alternative tests have been
offered by various justices. See id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy offered to base the Court's analysis of such
cases on a factor of coercion. See id. at 662 (recognizing that "[aibsent coercion,
the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic
accommodation is minimal"); cf. Rezai, supra note 1, at 537 (noting that "a
consistent standard of judicial adjudication can exist" and recommending that
"Itihe Lemon test... be abandoned and replaced with a reformulation of Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test") (footnote omitted). Unfortunately, neither the
existing analysis nor the alternatives seem to be without flaw.
129 See IVERS, supra note 12, at 115-18 (discussing the methods of O'Connor
and Kennedy); Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 694-97 (presenting the theories
of Kennedy and Stevens).
130 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 688 (discussing problems inherent in
the endorsement test).
131 See id. at 688 (stating that "among the majority of Justices who do agree
that the endorsement test should be used, there is no consistency in application.
The Justices have even failed to agree on the definition of essential terms").
132 See Rezai, supra note 1, at 520 (describing the endorsement test as an
"alternative" to Lemon and noting that it "combines the purpose and primary
effect prongs [of Lemon] into one element called endorsement").
'33 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.
13 See id. at 629 (noting that "the endorsement test depends on a
sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged
practice"); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (noting that "the
[Establishment Clause] inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can
be framed").
135 Rezai, supra note 1, at 521.
182
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made more complex.136 Inherent in the reasonable observer
inquiry is the question of whether a message is communicated to
non-adherents "that they do not fully belong to the community
and its political processes, while sending a message to adherents
that they are full and preferred participants of the political
community."'137
The endorsement test, as it has evolved from Lemon and
through sporadic application to holiday display cases, can be
broken down into three principle components. 138 The test looks to
the "context, composition, and location"139 of a display in
evaluating its constitutionality. 140 Once an evaluation is made of
the context, composition, and location, the message of the display
is assessed through the eyes of a reasonable observer to
determine whether the display ultimately endorses religion. 141
Specifically, with regard to context, the Court is concerned with a
display in the "national holiday context."142  Composition
considers a number of factors such as the figures, objects
displayed, and the display's focal point. 43 Perhaps similar to the
focal point consideration is the issue of the display's location.144 A
display located on public grounds creates a greater presumption
of a constitutional violation. 145 It is logical to view a display
erected on public property to be an endorsement of religion. 46 As
O'Connor noted, "[tihe display of religious symbols in public
136 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 688.
137 Rezai, supra note 1, at 520.
138 See Doe v. Clawson, 915 F.2d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1990).
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (discussing
endorsement and making an inquiry into whether " 'a reasonable observer'...
fairly [understood] government action to 'sen[d] a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community' ") (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Rezai, supra note 1, at 521
("To determine whether an action by the government amounts to endorsement,
an inquiry must be made as to whether an objective observer, who is familiar
with the action in question, would discern it as state sponsorship of a particular
faith or religion in general.").
142 Clawson, 915 F.2d at 247.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 626.
14 See id.
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areas of core government buildings runs a special risk of
'mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to
status in the political community.' "147. O'Connor's underlying
intent in conceiving the endorsement test was to loosen the
unyielding restrictions of Lemon in an attempt to ease the
position of minority religions.148 It would seem, however, that as
a result of the endorsement analysis, more displays containing
Christian and Jewish symbolism, both majority religions, pass
constitutional muster under the Lemon test. 149
In attempting to bring consistency to the Court, Justice
O'Connor offered the textually simplistic endorsement construct,
which serves as the basis of holiday display dispute resolution.15°
Unfortunately, this construct, serves as a source of confusion,
resulting in chaotic application by the lower federal courts. 51
Epitomizing the confusion created by contemporary
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the recent decision in
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Schundler.152
III. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY V.
SCHUNDLER: EPITOMIZING JUDICIAL CONFUSION
In Schundler, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit considered the constitutionality of a publicly-
funded display on public land, consisting of secular and religious
objects.153 The court, ultimately held that the modified holiday
display erected on public property was constitutional despite its
inclusion of numerous religious symbols.154 The procedural
history underlying Schundler is unusually complex. The complex
body of procedure in this case and the apparent confusion
exhibited by the court in resolving the issue makes Schundler a
prime example of the chaotic state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
147 Id. at 626 (alterations in original) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 692 (1984)).
148 See IvERs, supra note 12, at 116.
149 See generally Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573; Elewski v. Syracuse, 123 F.3d
51 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998).
150 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
151 See IvERS, supra note 12, at 118-20 (discussing the confusion of the
lower federal courts).
152 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999).
153 See id. at 96.
154 See id. at 109.
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A. Facts and Procedure
In celebration of the holiday season, Jersey City traditionally
erected a display in front of its City Hall. 155  The display
consisted primarily of a creche exhibited on the right side of City
Hall, and a menorah and Christmas tree exhibited on the left
side.156 In 1994, the American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey (ACLU) brought suit against the city, the city council, and
the mayor of Jersey City, Bret Schundler (collectively the
"City"), 157 claiming that the City's display violated both the state
and federal constitutions. 158 The ACLU sought to have the City
enjoined from continuing the display.159  The district court
ultimately found the display to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause and permanently enjoined the City from
maintaining the traditional display as well as any other
"substantially similar scene or display....-160
On December 13, 1995, the City erected a modified display
that consisted of the components of the unconstitutional display,
as well as figures of Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman; a
sled; Kwanzaa symbols; and two signs claiming that the display
was a celebration of ethnic diversity.161 The ACLU and other
155 See id. at 95. The court notes that the city had been erecting a display
"[firom at least 1965 until 1995 ..... Id.
156 See id. The size of the objects varied. The crbche included an 11 foot 9
inch manger, and figures of Mary, Joseph, Jesus, and the Three Wise Men, each
varying in height, the smallest of which was 12 inches and the largest 27
inches. See id. The menorah was 19 feet tall and the Christmas tree 13 feet. See
id.
157 The ACLU and four residents of Jersey City were the plaintiffs in the
action. See ACLU v. Schundler, 931 F. Supp. 1180, 1181 (D.N.J. 1995).
158 Prior to the actual commencement of the suit, the ACLU wrote a letter
to the City requesting that the City "discontinue its practice of displaying
religious symbols on public property." Schundler, 168 F.3d at 95. In response to
the letter, the City did not remove its display, but instead placed a sign next to
the display maintaining that the display was simply a part of an "ethnic"
celebration regarding Jersey City's "cultural" diversity. Id. The action was
originally brought in state court, citing challenges to both the federal and state
constitutions. See id. The City removed the case to federal district court. See id.
at 96.
159 See id. at 95.
160 Id. at 96. On November 28, 1995, the district court granted the ACLU's
motion for summary judgment, finding that the display violated both the
federal and state constitutions. See id.
161 See id. The figures of Santa and Frosty were 4 feet and 3 feet 10 inches
respectively. See id. The sled was 4 feet tall and the signs were each 2 feet by 3
feet. See id. The signs stated: "Through this display and others throughout the
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plaintiffs promptly moved to hold the City "in contempt of the
district court's injunction" and "sought a preliminary injunction
against the modified display."162 The district court denied these
requests, stating that the addition of the secular objects had
sufficiently "demystified" the religious nature of the display,
thereby making it constitutional and free from Establishment
Clause implications.163 The case was appealed, and a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the district
court's demystification analysis was desperately flawed and
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.164 On remand, the
district court found, based on an endorsement test analysis, that
the modified display was unconstitutional.165 The City appealed
and the case was again brought before the Third Circuit.166
The court of appeals, finding that the district court had
misinterpreted the Supreme Court's endorsement analysis, again
reversed the district court's decision, holding that the modified
display was indeed constitutional.1 67 It is apparent from this
decision that the circuit court itself misconstrued and misapplied
the endorsement test and undermined the integrity of its own
court by wholly disregarding dicta found in its prior panel
decision.
year, the City of Jersey City is pleased to celebrate the diverse cultural and
ethnic heritages of its peoples." Id.
162 Id.
163 See id.
164 See ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1450-51 (3d Cir. 1997).
165 See Schundler, 168 F.3d at 97 (discussing the district court holding and
stating that "the District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs
and held that the modified display violated the Constitution"). The district court
found specifically that the display, even after the addition of the secular objects,
would still fail Supreme Court endorsement analysis. See id. In so finding, the
court relied heavily on the Circuit Court panel's discussion of the context of the
display. See id. The district court was convinced that "discussion of the context
of the display after the addition of Frosty the Snowman, Santa and a red sled
leaves little doubt that... the display communicates the City's endorsement of
Christianity and Judaism in violation of the Establishment Clause." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
166 See id.
167 See id. at 108-09. The appeal also included a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5) motion. See id. at 109. The Third Circuit affirmed the part of
the district court's decision that denied the defendant City relief under Rule
60(b)(5). See id. The 60(b)(5) motion is beyond the scope of this Note.
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B. Rationale of the Court
In determining the constitutionality of the display, the court
of appeals purported to have applied the endorsement test. 168 In
dealing with the context aspect of the analysis, the court found
that a reasonable observer would not conclude that the display
was meant to endorse religion, but instead to celebrate the
cultural and ethnic diversity of Jersey City residents.169
Moreover, the court held the display constitutional because it
was "unable to perceive any meaningful constitutional distinction
between the display at issue here and those that the Supreme
Court upheld in Lynch and Allegheny County."170
The dissent, on the other hand, found that there were many
distinctions between the present case and Lynch-Allegheny.' 7'
Acknowledging the "confusion" and abundance of
"jurisprudential disagreement" surrounding the Establishment
Clause, the dissent argued that an analysis of the context of the
display, required by the endorsement test, led to its conclusion.72
Essentially, it is the position of this author, that the "message" of
the modified display was the same as the original.173
C. Analysis
Schundler is unique in that the court was testing the
constitutionality of a "modified" display whose predecessor had
been declared unconstitutional.174 Therefore, the question before
the court should have been somewhat different than the question
before a court evaluating the constitutionality of an "original"
display. 175 In testing the constitutionality of an original display,
18 See id. at 103-04 ("Accordingly, in considering how the modified Jersey
City display now before us fares under Allegheny County, we will focus on
Justice O'Connor's opinion.").
169 See id. at 106 ("Moreover, although this factor is not necessary to our
decision, we are convinced that in evaluating the message conveyed by the
modified Jersey City display to a reasonable observer, the general scope of
Jersey City's practice regarding diverse cultural displays and celebrations
should be considered.").
170 Id. at 107.
171 See id. at 109-13 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
172 See id. at 109.
173 See id. at 114.
174 See id. at 98.
175 See id. at 96 (noting that based on an evaluation of the original display,
the City was "permanently enjoined... from erecting its traditional display or
any substantially similar scene or display").
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courts are concerned with whether the display itself violates the
Establishment Clause.1 6 In cases concerning a modified display,
the question becomes whether the display is the same or
"substantially similar" to the display previously held to be
unconstitutional. 177 Although the modified display in Schundler
changed physically, some important elements remained. 78 These
elements allowed the focal points of the first and modified
displays to remain wholly unchanged. 79 Therefore, the message
of the modified display was essentially the same as that of the
original, and thus, the modified display should have been deemed
unconstitutional as well.8o The Schundler court completely
disregarded and failed to analyze the message of the display in
resolving the issue.'18 Had the court addressed these issues, logic
would dictate a contrary holding.
The primary concern of the endorsement test is an
evaluation of the message of the display. 8 2 This primary concern
weakens the validity of the test when applied to cases evaluating
modified displays. 83 The Supreme Court's analyses of holiday
display cases make random and inconsistent reference to the
standard of a "reasonable observer" when determining whether
the display endorses religion.18 This concept, essential to an
accurate evaluation of the display's message, has been scantily
176 See, eg., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594-97 (1989) (discussing
cases that have addressed the application of the Establishment Clause to
displays with religious meaning).
177 Schundler, 168 F.3d at 96.
178 See id. Certain elements were added, such as plastic figures of Santa
Claus and Frosty the Snowman, a sled, Kwanzaa symbols, and signs which
recognized the diverse cultural and ethnic heritage of the people. Yet, the focal
points of the display remained, namely the crbche and the menorah. See id.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 114 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the message of
this display remains the same as that of the original display").
181 See infra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
182 See Rezai, supra note 1, at 533 (noting that the "primary concern" of
endorsement analysis is the effect a display may have on "minorities and
nonadherents").
188 See Schundler, 168 F.3d at 109 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the real question in a modified display case is whether the additions to the
display sufficiently change the display's context so as to negate the message
that was conveyed by the original unconstitutional display).
184 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 690-94 (discussing the problems
inherent in applying a "reasonable observer" analysis to the situation, the
misapplication of the term, and the disagreement among the Justices as to what
it actually means).
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defined and has proven to be a source of confusion.185 Moreover,
in the realm of religion, there is no universal standard for a
reasonable observer because people of different religions are
likely to disagree on what constitutes an endorsement of
religion.186 A reasonable observer, aware of the circumstances,
"history and ubiquity,187 would make changing the message of a
display originally held to be unconstitutional virtually
impossible. A reasonable observer would know of the history of
the unconstitutional display and presuppose the message of the
display to have remained despite the addition of secular
objects.188 Therefore, the endorsement test becomes relatively
useless in evaluating modified displays previously held to be
unconstitutional.
The Court has recognized the fact-sensitive nature of holiday
display cases. 189 It would appear that in a case concerning a
"modified" holiday display, certain areas of endorsement analysis
may become more crucial to the resolution of the issue than
others. For example, the endorsement test recognizes that "the
government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it
has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the
government's use of religious symbolism depends upon its
context." 90  It would seem that in a case where the
constitutionality of the display has been previously decided, the
issue of context demands a more careful look.
It becomes apparent that although the symbols associated
with holidays may have religious origins, many have evolved into
something more secular.' 9' The winter holiday season has
become an almost entirely commercial endeavor.92 The holidays
185 See id.
186 See id. at 692.
187 Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that "history and ubiquity" are factors in determining the perspective of
a "reasonable observer").
188 See Schundler, 168 F.3d at 114-15 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the dominant message of the modified display remains an endorsement of
religion).
189 See, eg., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (noting that these
cases are "fact sensitive"); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 607-08 (commenting on the
"fact-specific nature" of the issue).
19o Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).
191 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
192 See Interview with Thomas F. Shea, Professor of Law, St. John's
University School of Law, in Jamaica, N.Y. (Sept. 14, 1999) (on file with
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have become a means for government, through the vehicle of city-
organized displays and the promotion of holiday glee, to profit by
transforming an originally religious "holiday" into an almost
secular and nationally recognized excuse to spend money.193 The
fact that the holidays may have become more secular, however,
does not defeat the contention that a reasonable observer, an
outsider, or non-adherent to Christianity or Judaism would view
displays such as these, including two very sectarian symbols, as
an endorsement of religion.194
The endorsement test was intended to be easier to satisfy
than the Lemon test. 95 Consistent with this approach, Jersey
City's display was clearly an endorsement of religion.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit applied the same logic in
resolving the issue that the district court originally applied,
which the circuit court had condemned as an incorrect
analysis. 96 Essentially, the Third Circuit held that the presence
and size of a few token secular symbols "demystified" the sanctity
author). Professor Shea offered insight into potential justifications for the
varying interpretations of the Supreme Court. He proposed a possible balancing
test based on the idea of "rough proportionality" in the law of takings. See id.;
see also Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (discussing "rough
proportionality"). The idea is that, similar to the constitutional demand
employed in the law of takings, there be a rough proportionality between what
the government takes and what is to be given as retribution. With regard to
holiday display cases, there should be a "rough proportionality" of secular
objects as compared to religious objects. See Interview with Thomas F. Shea,
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, in Jamaica, N.Y. (Sept.
14, 1999).
193 See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting that a
holiday display serves a commercial purpose as well as a religious one).
194 See Rezai, supra note 1, at 538 ("An adherent of the religion being
endorsed will not be inclined to view the action as endorsement by the
government, but a nonadherent may perceive the same act as a blatant
endorsement of religion.").
195 See IVERs, supra note 12, at 116 (describing the endorsement test as
"less rigorous" than Lemon).
196 The Schundler court reasoned that the addition of objects secularized
the religious display. See ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 104-05 (3d Cir.
1999). The court did not find that the modified display was constitutional
because of the subtraction of certain religious symbols. See id. Therefore, the
court essentially reasoned that the addition of secular symbols demystified the
sacred notion of the display.
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of the display, albeit without using those words. 197 The court
placed slight emphasis on the non-adherent/outsider aspect of
the endorsement test.19s
Furthermore, Schundler may be distinguished from Lynch
and Allegheny in a number of ways. 199 In Lynch, the Supreme
Court was deciding the constitutionality of a display erected on
private land, consisting of a "winter wonderland," in which one of
the elements happened to be a creche.200 The message displayed
was purely secular, intent on acknowledging and promoting the
holiday season.2 01 In Allegheny, the Court evaluated two distinct
displays.202 The Allegheny Court recognized that a menorah can
be secular in the proper context, coupled with the proper
symbols.203 In the present case, the court was deciding the
constitutional validity of a display, the primary objects of which
were a creche and a menorah. 204
The Supreme Court has recognized that, unlike a menorah,
the "creche itself is capable of communicating a religious
message.205 The Court has also acknowledged that, in the
United States, the menorah, although typically associated with
Judaism, reflects a secular dimension.26 The Court, however,
has never stated that the menorah is inherently secular. In fact,
although Justice Blackmun subscribed to the view that the
menorah was secular, at least in Allegheny's particular context,207
his opinion in Allegheny also noted indirectly that the menorah
197 See id.
198 See id. at 106 (noting that "the message conveyed by the modified Jersey
City display to a reasonable observer" was in fact a consideration in evaluating
the display's constitutionality).
199 See id. at 109-13 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Schundler
from Lynch and Allegheny).
200 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). The display also
included a Santa Claus house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
carolers, and colored lights. See id.
201 See Interview with Thomas F. Shea, supra note 192.
202 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989).
203 See id. at 585-87 (describing the menorah as both a religious and
secular symbol).
204 See Schundler, 168 F.3d at 95.
205 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.
2o0 See id. at 582-86.
207 The menorah in Allegheny was displayed alongside a Christmas tree.
The display essentially consisted of a towering Christmas tree and a much
smaller menorah displayed to its side. See id. at 587.
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may be viewed as a purely religious symbol.208 If the same logic
Blackmun used in applying the endorsement test in Allegheny is
used to resolve the issue in Schundler, and the same factors are
considered-namely, context and configuration-as well as
religious significance, the Schundler modified display cannot
pass constitutional muster. The City Hall of Jersey City is
located on land owned by the government and the display is
therefore inherently suspect.2 9 Upon approaching the Hall, a
reasonable observer would find a large menorah on one side,
garnished delicately with a Christmas tree and a similarly sized
cr6che on the other, surrounded by plastic secular symbols. It is
doubtful that upon approaching the building, a reasonable
observer would not perceive the display as a whole, configured as
described, as a display of governmental approval and
endorsement of religion. In such a scene, the menorah's religious
significance would be heightened by the cr~che's purely religious
message. The menorah then becomes a religious symbol and
therefore the display as a whole would become an overwhelming
endorsement of religion, with Judaism and Christianity serving
as the focus of the display.210 Surely, an outsider or non-adherent
would feel as though the government was endorsing religion in
the display. The non-adherent would not feel like a "full
member[] of the political community," the message having been
sent that Christians and Jews are the "favored members of the
political community."211
D. Confusion Below
Further illustrating the complexity and confusion of holiday
display cases are the varying applications of the endorsement
208 See id. at 582-86.
209 See id. at 626 ("The display of religious symbols in public areas of core
government buildings runs a special risk of 'mak[ing] religion relevant, in
reality or public perception, to status in the political community.' ") (citing
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
210 See id. at 599. Similar to the poinsettias that served to highlight the
crbche display in Allegheny, the religious objects in Schundler are highlighted
by secular items. See id.; see also Laura Ahn, Note, This is Not a Creche, 107
YALE L.J. 1969, 1972 (1998) (discussing generally the problems with the Court's
application of the "context" factor and the role secular symbols play in that
context).
211 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 626.
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test throughout the federal circuits. 212 For example, in Amancio
v. Somerset,213 the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts resolved a case involving a holiday display quite
similar to the Schundler display. The court applied the
endorsement test, focusing more on some aspects of the test than
others.214 The court in Amancio relied heavily on the dominance
of the objects, the composition, and focal point of the display,
borrowing ideas articulated in Allegheny.215 The court was able
to distinguish the display from that of Lynch because each object
in Lynch had its own focal point, and therefore a reasonable
observer would not perceive the display as a government
endorsement of religion.216 If this focal point consideration was
applied in Schundler, the display, as perceived by a reasonable
non-adherent, would be unconstitutional. In Schundler, the focal
points of the display were two highly religious symbols garnished
with secular nostalgia.217  The display in Lynch passed
constitutional muster because each object of the "winter
wonderland" consisted of its own focal point. 218 These varying
and random considerations have significantly contributed to
confusion in the courts below and the inconsistent application of
the endorsement test.21 9 One constant in this constitutional mess
seems to be that the fate of the display as a whole is dependent
upon the nature of the potentially sectarian object displayed.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES
The Supreme Court has a few options. One option would be
to adopt a new test-possibly based on Justice Kennedy's
"coercion test" or Justice Stevens's more "separationist" test--or
212 See IvERS, supra note 12, at 118-20 (discussing the split in the circuits
below).
218 28 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D. Mass. 1998).
214 The display consisted of a creche, lights, a wreath, Christmas tree, and
Santa Clause. See id. at 678.
215 See id. at 679.
216 See id.
217 See ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1999).
218 See Amancio, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
219 See IVERS, supra note 12, at 118-20.
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allow the courts below to continue to issue varying and
subjectively motivated opinions. 220  Considering the varying
philosophies on the bench, it is difficult to imagine that the
recalcitrant Court will subscribe to an entirely new test. Another
solution may be to redefine the endorsement test and apply it
consistently.221 The greatest problem with Establishment Clause
analysis is the fact that the Court has unsuccessfully attempted
to find a functional test. The Court has attempted to maintain a
standard that allows a holiday display to contain religious
symbols as long as there are enough secular symbols to detract
from the inherent undertones of the sectarian symbols. The
Court risks offending those whose very religious freedom they
are purporting to protect by forcing the secular symbols upon
them. Specifically, it is highly unlikely that a devout Jew would
be comfortable subscribing to the Court's idea that a menorah is
a secular symbol. Similarly, it is likely that a dedicated
Christian would be offended by the notion that Christmas is a
"national" and no longer a "religious" holiday. In maintaining
this balance, the Court has been forced to employ wholly
subjective logic. This has led to reliance upon swing votes and
semantic persuasion in an attempt to convolute the meaning and
intent of the Establishment Clause, perpetuating a masquerade
of constitutionality despite the dictates of logic.222
To solve this problem, the Court should simplify its test to
either allow more religious symbolism or provide stricter
enforcement of separation of church and state amounting to a
reversion to perceived archaic ideals of erecting a wall of
separation between church and state.223 The solution is to
employ a test that will allow for consistent application,
comprehension in the courts below, and uniformity of decisions.
This test would have to be a simple one, so as to guarantee the
aforementioned goals.
220 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (introducing the concept of coercion);
see also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
221 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 698.
222 See id. at 688 (noting that sharp philosophical divisions exist among the
Justices of the Supreme Court).
223 See id. at 672 (discussing the Everson Court's "'strict separationist' view
of the establishment clause").
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Two existing ideals provide the framework for potential new
tests capable of resolving holiday display cases.224 These tests
would result in either greater flexibility and use of greater
religious symbolism, or stricter enforcement of separation of
church and state and allowance of fewer religious symbols in
displays. 225 On one side of the spectrum is Justice Kennedy's
"coercion" analysis, which finds support in the ideals of Chief
Justice Rehnquist. 226 Kennedy's test would find Establishment
Clause violations only when holiday displays, complete with
sectarian symbols, serve to coerce one into adopting the exhibited
religious beliefs.227 Such a test connotes that the display itself
would essentially need to be a display of numerous symbols, with
no attempt to include secular symbols or detract at all from the
religious ones.228 Therefore, application of such a test would
likely result in allowing a greater number of religious displays,
essentially loosening the requirements of the Establishment
Clause. 229
On the other side of the spectrum would be a test that allows
less religious symbolism to be tolerated in holiday displays. Such
a test would carry a "[piresumption of [iinvalidity"230 for all those
displays in which a religious symbol was found.231 Such a test
was offered by Justice Stevens in Allegheny.23 2 This test would
consist of a preliminary determination of whether a symbol is
religious in nature and then allow for rebuttal.233 Presuming a
violation because of the mere inclusion of a religious symbol
would clearly place stricter requirements on a holiday display,
but allow for easier application and more consistent decisions.234
Stevens intended this test to be a modification of the
224 See id. at 690 (discussing generally "reasonable" alternatives to the
endorsement test).
225 See id. at 694-97 (discussing Justices Kennedy's and Stevens's
alternatives to the endorsement test).
226 See id. at 694.
227 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989).
22 See id. (noting that both the religious and the secular need to be
accommodated).
229 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 694-96 (noting that it would be
difficult to draw the line at where religious displays become unconstitutional).
230 Id. at 696.
231 See id.
232 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650.
233 See Lewis & Vild, supra note 10, at 697.
234 See id. at 696 (noting that this test is a "workable tool").
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endorsement test while still allowing for evaluation of the display
in light of its context.235 Therefore, although the inclusion of a
religious symbol in a display would create a presumption of
unconstitutionality, that presumption would be rebuttable,
allowing an exploration into the context of the display.236
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the endorsement analysis has escaped its
original bounds and is growing more incomprehensible with each
new application. It is applied inconsistently, with different
aspects of the analysis relied on more or less in each court. It
was originally offered by Justice O'Connor to clarify the state of
Establishment Clause law. Practical application of the
endorsement test has served only to confuse the lower courts,
and has bred inconsistency. The test attempted to foster a
feeling of greater acceptance among minority religions by
smoothing the rigidity imposed by Lemon. Unfortunately, the
test only serves to uphold a greater number of Christian and
Jewish displays, the two major religions in the United States.
The test has proven to be a failure in resolving holiday display
cases, specifically those involving a "modified" display.
Therefore, in an attempt to clarify the state of Establishment
Clause law, the United States Supreme Court should re-evaluate
its prior conclusions and either modify their endorsement
analysis or propose an entirely new test.
235 See id.
236 See id. at 697.
